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Abstract
Since 2009 there have been more than 100 people injured and 4 killed in incidents involving four wheel drive vehicles on world 
heritage listed Fraser Island, off the southern Queensland coast, Australia. As a gazetted road any person with a regular on-road 
or international driving license is permitted to drive on the beach at up to 80km / hour. However, the beach driving environment 
is one of rapid change, unstable surfaces, pedestrian priority, distraction and limited signage nor instruction. Given the beach 
context, it is apparent that the beach driving ‘system’ is different to the standard road system’; however, this is yet to be explored 
both in regard to the contributory factors involved in road crashes and to the responsibilities for beach driving safety. The study 
presented in this paper is a response to this, attempting to identify the differences and the resulting implications for crash 
prevention. This paper uses the sociotechnical systems approach of AcciMap to explore and describe the range of governance 
structures and the large variety of actors associated with beach driving on Fraser Island. The resultant ActorMap is then 
examined in consideration of the multiple levels of causality in the context of the beach as a fatal roadway environment. The 
results allow for a greater understanding of the vertical integration between the array of decision-makers and the accidents. As 
well as showing clearly that beach crashes represent a significantly different problem space to road crashes, this paper identifies a 
number of significant failures in the management and regulation of beach driving on Fraser Island, and makes recommendations 
for change. In closing this paper articulates a research agenda designed to enhance our understanding of the cultural, economic, 
and social implications of beach and off-road driving to improve safety and stakeholder coordination.
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Fig. 1. Fraser Island (K’gari) geographic context (Source: Google Maps).
1. Introduction
Fraser Island or K’gari (paradise) in the language of the local aboriginal people, is the largest sand island in the 
world and is located off the southern Queensland coast, Australia. It is 120 kilometers in length and approximately 
24 kilometers at its widest point (Figure 1). It has a residential population of only 195, yet it receives approximately 
400,000 annual visitors in the form of daytrips and short term stays. It is a popular destination for local, national and 
international tourists, with more than 80% of visitors camping within the dunal systems in designated areas along 
the eastern beach. Access to the island is by barge while access and travel around the island is afforded by the use of 
4WD vehicles traversing the eastern beach and sandy inland tracks. 
The beaches of K’gari, like any Queensland beach on which vehicles are permitted to drive, are considered 
gazetted roads under state government legislation. That is, all road rules and regulations that pertain to state 
government constructed and managed roadways, also apply to the beaches. While this allows for greater regulation, 
enforcement and prosecution, it is not without complication. A gazetted road permits any person with regular on-
road or international licensing is permitted to drive on the beach at up to 80km/hour. However, the beach driving 
environment is one of rapid change, unstable surfaces, pedestrian priority, and distraction – with limited signage, 
instruction or road infrastructure. It is a roadway context of vast unfamiliarity for the majority of drivers, further 
compounded by the necessity of the use of 4WD vehicles which have high rollover risks for inexperienced drivers
[1].
This unique driving environment on K’gari has resulted in numerous accidents and most significantly 4 fatalities 
from 3 separate accidents since 2009. Considering the approximately 400,000 annual visitors to the island this 
statistic, when compared to the mainland road accident statistics, seems relatively immaterial. However, context 
matters and 96% of the accidents on the island involved single vehicles, and all of the deaths to date involved
foreign tourists being killed in single vehicle rollovers. Three of the deaths were as a result of two independent 
motor vehicle accidents that occurred in April and December 2009.  All three of the fatalities were passengers in 
4WD hire vehicles being driven by a fellow tourist, who they had only recently met, driving on sand for the first 
time. The fourth fatality in December 2014 was the driver of the vehicle and this accident occurred on an inland 
unsealed sand road.
At the time of the 2009 accidents international tourists were permitted to undertake self-drive tours of the island. 
Since 2011 these tourist groups are required to be part of ‘tag-a-long’ tours. While theystill self-drive, they are part 
of a convoy of up to 6 vehicles that is led by an experienced 4WD operator from the tour company. The most recent 
fatality occurred while the tourist in question was participating in this type of monitored 4WD excursion. 
Prior to departure the designated tourist drivers of the 4WD vehicles are required, by law, to view a 30 minute 
instructional video, undertake a vehicle inspection and complete a 30 minute test drive of their designated vehicle. 
This instruction is provided by the tour company. 
There is no doubt that beach driving crashes represent a significant problem. As a result, standard road safety 
interventions are being applied, particularly when visitor numbers are high. These include the use of speed cameras 
and random alcohol and drug testing. Whilst this is encouraging, the program of research from which this paper 
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derives argues that the unique context in which beach driving occurs renders the standard road safety approach 
inappropriate. Despite the fact that beach roads are treated as gazetted roads, they are very different to standard road 
environments, and, as such, there may be an opportunity to implement new context driven interventions. A first step 
in determining this requires that the beach driving context be described and understood. In particular, the extent to 
which the environment and associated crashes are different to standard road environments and crashes needs 
exploration. In addition, the stakeholders who share responsibility for beach driving crashes should be identified (in 
order to determine what can be done to prevent them).This paper attempts to fulfil these first steps by exploring the 
range of actors involved within the beach driving system, along with the contributory factors involved in the recent 
incidents described above. 
1.1. Regulatory environment for beach driving on K’gari
The eastern beach on K’gari is designated a gazetted road and as such the driving environment is managed under 
a range of legislation. The Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads (TMR) is responsible for the 
management and implementation of Transport Operations (Road Use Management—Road Rules) Regulation 2009, 
which largely constitutes Queensland road rules; Transport Operations (Road Use Management—Driver Licensing) 
Regulation 2010; and the Transport Infrastructure Act 1994. 
Adding complexity to the legislative and beach driving environment on K’gari is the management of the island 
by the Department of National Parks, Recreation, Sport and Racing’s (NPRSR) Queensland Parks and Wildlife 
Service (QPWS). The OPWS is responsible for the issuing of access permits which allow vehicles to use the beach 
as a road, under the Recreation Areas Management Act 2006. The day to day management of the island by QPWS 
and in line with its world heritage status also has implications for the management of the beach as a road way 
environment. Under the Federal Governments Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, and 
the State Governments Nature Conservation Act 1992, there are the obligations to manage and protect the island. In 
part, this means that natural processes which impact the beach environment, such as erosion and the exposure of 
hazards such as rocks, are left to take their course and not interfered with. 
Regulation and oversight of this complex multi-departmental milieu is also undertaken by the Queensland Police 
Service, with responsibility for enforcement on speed limits and drink and drug driving.  Additionally, personnel 
from the Department of Transport and Main Roads are responsible for vehicle compliance and safety inspections on 
K’gari beaches.
2. Systems thinking models and methods
The term ‘systems thinking’ in this case is used to describe a philosophy currently prevalent within the discipline 
of human factors that is applied to understand and improve performance and safety in complex sociotechnical 
systems [2]. It has been prominent for the last two decades in the area of accident analysis (e.g. [3] [4]) but has also 
enjoyed significant attention in the areas of systems analysis and design in many areas (e.g. [5][6] [7]).
There are various key tenets (see Rasmussen, 1997 [4]); however, the prevailing philosophy is that safety, and 
indeed accidents, are emergent properties arising from non-linear interactions between multiple components across 
complex sociotechnical systems (e.g. Leveson, 2004 [3]). 
Rasmussen (1997) argues that systems comprise various levels (e.g. government, regulators, company, company 
management, staff, and work), each of which are co-responsible for production and safety. Decisions and actions at 
all levels of the system interact with one another to shape it’s performance: both safety and accidents are thus shaped 
by the decisions of all actors, not just the front line workers in isolation, and accidents are caused by multiple 
contributing factors, not just one bad decision or action. A key implication is that it is not possible to truly 
understand safety and performance through decomposing the system into component parts and examining these 
parts alone (e.g. drivers, vehicles); rather, it is the interactions between the components that are of interest.
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2.1. Accimap
Rasmussen proposes the Accimap analysis framework as an appropriate methodology for understanding 
accidents in line with his systems thinking inspired risk management framework. Accimap is used to graphically 
represent accident trajectories, including contributory factors and the causal relationships between them. The output 
provides a detailed representation of the network of contributory factors that pushed the system in question over its 
boundary of safe performance.To do so, Accimap decomposes the system in question into the following six 
organizational levels: 1. government policy and budgeting; 2. regulatory bodies and associations; 3. local area 
government planning & budgeting (including company management); 4. technical and operational management; 5. 
physical processes and actor activities; and 6. equipment and surroundings. 
Decisions and actions implicated in the causal network at each of the levels are identified and linked between and 
across levels based on cause-effect relations. As a generic framework that is applicable in any domain, Accimap has 
been applied in various areas, including outdoor recreation [8], space travel [9], and public health [10]. More 
recently studies and articles have applied Accimap in the road transport context[11][12][2]. The results have been 
encouraging. Indeed, Salmon and Lenne (2015) [2] make the strong case that Rasmussen’s approaches are required 
to make additional reductions in road trauma.
3. Methods – Developing theActorMap
The analysis described within this paper was developed by researchers with the Centre for Human Factors and 
Sociotechnical Systems at the University of the Sunshine Coast, Queensland Australia. The ActorMap was 
constructed from a range of sources, including the findings of inquest into the 2009 deaths from the Office of the 
State Coroner [13]. The Coroner’s report details the circumstances surrounding the deaths and highlights key 
stakeholders within the complex actor system. Importantly it describes the circumstance surrounding the hiring of 
the vehicles; the vehicles specifications; the crashes themselves and the aftermath and actions taken by the range of 
actors. The identification of further actors was facilitated via documentation review of Federal, State and Local 
government regulatory environments, including management and policy documentation as it related to both gazetted 
road environments and driving on K’gari more specifically. Further actors were also identified through a desktop
search of community and environmental groups and strategies utilizing both K’gari and Fraser Island as key search 
terms.
4. Results: Accimap – ActorMap
The Accimap analysis discussed within this paper involved developing an ActorMap of the beach driving system 
on K’gari (an examination of the systems analysis of the two fatal 2009 accidents is forthcoming (Stevens & Salmon 
(under review)). This systems depiction shows the levels and range of actors that are involved and thus that share the 
responsibility for beach driving incidents. While the ActorMap was developed based on the K’gari beach driving 
system; it is anticipated to be generically applicable to a range of beach driving and off road environments both 
nationally and internationally. 
The ActorMap presented in Figure 2 shows the range of actors that are deemed to play a role in the beach driving 
system on K’gari and thus to share the responsibility for beach driving crashes. This paper will now discuss each 
level in turn and highlight further interdependencies, opportunities and indeed conflicts between the actors. 
First and foremost the ActorMap shows that there is a diverse range of actors and organizations operating within
the beach driving system. There is a variety of international, national, state and local stakeholders, in addition to 
community organizations, NGOs and individuals that have a role to play in the creation, management and indeed 
improvement of the beach driving system. They span all six levels of the Accimap indicating that the issues 
associated with beach driving and beach driving accidents on K’gari are complex and interdependent, and that beach 
driving crashes are indeed a systems problem that could be dealt with through systemic interventions (not just 
interventions on the beach such as enforcement). An important implication here is that the decisions and actions of 
multiple stakeholders across the entire beach driving system will interact to play a role in beach driving crashes. 
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Rasmussen stresses the importance of vertical integration in systems, suggesting that without it, systems can lose 
control of safety critical processes. The structure of the ActorMap suggests that there are potentially gaps in both the 
vertical and horizontal integration across actors. For example when considering policy formulation at the top of the 
system, down to implementation and monitoring of safety and regulatory interventions at a technical level. Further 
within this range of organizations there are competing priorities both at a policy level and in decision-making. For 
example the objectives of Federal Governments Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, in 
line with the world heritage status of K’gari, seek higher levels of environment protection than those afforded under 
the State Governments Recreation Areas Management Act 2006. Further, the convenience afforded to state and local 
government authorities by maintaining the beach as the primary transport corridor holds little consideration for the 
management of critical beach sites as feeding areas for local and long-distance migratory shorebirds. Indeed the 
priorities and impacts of a range of commercial uses of the beach are outwardly at odds with those of recreational 
and conservation organizations
4.1. Government policy and budgeting
There is a significant range of high level actors and/or organisations who reside within the beach driving system. 
It is important to note that the use of the coroner’s report to establish the ActorMap has necessitated the inclusion of 
the Queensland State Coroner at this level. Further, when considering the beach driving system it has been necessary 
to also include ARRB Consulting, the authors of a 2005 Road User Safety Review of driving on Fraser Island. This 
document made 35 recommendations for safety of the beach driving and international tourism (following concerns 
for safety prior to 2005), however these were not implemented until after 2009 fatal accidents. 
There is significant international representation – UNESCO – and associated federal government responsibility; 
including the recent (November 2014) Native Title recognition of the Butchulla people. This has implications and 
requires a new closer working relationship between Department of National Parks, Recreation, Sport and Racing, 
the state government more generally and the Butchulla tribe. This Indigenous Land Use Agreement strengthens the 
Butchulla people’s ability to enjoy and protect their rights and interests over their traditional lands and waters. It 
allows them a necessary role in the future use and management of the island, including issues of flora and fauna 
protection and importantly the appropriateness of facilities and tourist access on the island.  
Fig. 2.ActorMap of beach driving on K’gari.
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4.2. Regulatory bodies and associations
Queensland Police and the emergency services more generally have a significant role to play, with the former 
currently involved in driving enforcement activities and the latter involved in shaping the response to beach driving 
incidents.. By virtue of the limited access to the island it is a remote location and emergency assistance is not 
afforded immediately when required. Indeed there is a necessary link here through the Local government and 
company management level to the technical and operational level of this system that deals with the affordance of 
mobile phone coverage by the Telco’s for the entire eastern beach. The local council and island communities have 
objected to the location of the necessary phone tower on aesthetic grounds, but of concern is the conflict in 
placement which would in fact limit the ability of emergency service helicopters to land safely.
Other important roles are played out at this level. The Parks and Wildlife Service share some responsibility for 
the state of the inland roads and often engage in road maintenance activities. At this level there is both conflict and 
opportunity between Queensland Tourism Board, Parks and Wildlife Service and Police. K’gari is a major 
international tourism destination, yet a balance between, tourist numbers, driving safety and environmental 
protection of the beaches is yet to be achieved. There are in fact no accurate records describing the number of 
tourists visiting the island and there are few limitations (for what?), further there are few academic studies that 
explore the impact of the beach as a road on flora and fauna.
Interestingly at this level all of the identified actors are state government based or indeed reliant on funding from 
the state government. Much of their capacity for change, cooperation, or the implementation of policy or programs 
is tied to the budgetary considerations and current political perspectives or appetite for specific portfolios. There is 
limited ability then for independent approaches or thinking beyond a particular party doctrine – a
significantconstraint within this system.  
4.3. Local government and company management
This level contains a mix of state and local government; community; and commercial based actors and 
organizations. These agencies are responsible for much of the integration and implementation of their respective 
policies including regulation and monitoring. The role of environmental advocacy groups is strongest here, with a 
larger scope for ‘free voices’, unencumbered by politics or party policy. These organizations, along with those of 
business representation have the capacity to lobby strongly to the regulatory bodies above, and influence the 
technical and operations levels below.
Importantly the Fraser Island Traffic Accident Committee is embedded at this level. In 2009, this group was 
charged with progressing the recommendations of the 2005 ARRB Report. This committee comprises a government 
response to who they believe are most responsible for traffic accident on K’gari, and includes Queensland Transport; 
Department of Environment and Heritage Protection; Queensland Police and the Fraser Coast Council (local 
government). While there are important links established here between operations and policy, it reflects only a 
governmental response to an issue which is far more complex and with many more actors. Such an approach is left 
at the whim of budgetary constraints and political motivations, potentially eroding key functions and further 
inhibiting the safety of beaches as roads. 
4.4. Technical and operational management
The technical and operational management level contains actors who are responsible for the actual facilitation of 
the act of beach driving on K’gari. Here we can recognise not only the companies that are responsible for the hire of 
4WD, but also the companies who offer the tour packages and are responsible for the training of inexperienced 4WD 
operators. The actors at this level represent the public / private interface where much of the necessary intervention is 
required to ensure that education and information is disseminated and shared between the users of the beach as a 
road. 
Uniquely within this system, because the beach is the road, there no technical actors responsible for the operation 
or management of the physical roadway. These tasks are taken care of through the natural processes of storms and 
tides. Further, this stripped back roadway system has only two major practical elements, and actors, which impact 
2611 Nicholas J. Stevens and Paul M. Salmon /  Procedia Manufacturing  3 ( 2015 )  2605 – 2612 
the levels of safety and response when driving on K’gari. These are the actors concerned with the design and 
manufacture of 4WDs; and the actors which represent the Telcos and the affordance of on-island mobile phone 
coverage.
Since the fatal incidents of 2009 there have been some legislative and policy changes which have had operational 
consequences. For example, the number of tourists within each vehicle is limited to 8, and each must have their own 
forward facing seat. Additionally the introduction of the tag-a-long tour, in lieu of self-drive tours has become 
mandatory. These changes have had implications for the physical processes level of the beach as a road ActorMap. 
4.5. Physical processes and actor activities
The physical processes and actors activities level represents the beach driving activity itself within the beach 
environment. The actor interactions at this level are critical to the safety of the beach as road. The key actors at this 
level are of course the drivers; however, it has to be noted that other important actors are present. For example, other 
beach users, such as those engaging in recreational activities (e.g. fishing, sunbathing, physical exercise, dune 
walking) can enter and depart the road as and when they like. In addition, aeroplanes transporting tourists and 
offering scenic flights often land and take off from the beach. These actors who interact with drivers represent 
another critical and unique aspect of beach driving.
The capacity of the drivers to operate an unfamiliar vehicle; the appropriate role and responsibility of passengers 
within these vehicles to behave in a safe and supportive manner. In fact it was the interactions and the actors at this 
level (and the equipment and surroundings level below) that were the focus of the Coroner’s report, when it 
apportioned much of the responsibility for the fatal accidents in 2009. Considering the tourist experience, what may 
be recognised is that the relationship between the driver and the passenger is largely one of unfamiliarity and this 
changes the dynamic and often the ability for individuals to seek, or speak out about responsible behaviours.
The levels of driver training and the appropriateness of that training must be considered here. Considering the 
international nature of the tourists visiting the island, it is reasonable to expect that English is a second language for 
many. The domestic response to driver training for beach driving, is largely to undertake the activity and to learn as 
you go. Owners of their own 4WD vehicles are not required to undertake any specialist training prior to driving on 
K’gari, or indeed any beach roadway environment in Australia.   
A final feature of beach driving is the fluid nature in which it unfolds. Indeed, what is unique about this driving 
environment is the role that other beacher users and beach drivers play in community driver safety. While the keep 
left rules apply under Queensland law, when driving on the beach it is not uncommon for oncoming traffic to pass to 
either the left or right of you depending on beach conditions.  However it is convention for drivers to use their 
vehicle indicators to shown their intentions.
4.6. Equipment and surroundings  
This level of the ActorMap highlights the equipment and surroundings underpinning beach driving. Again, the 
compelling finding is that the environment is entirely different to conventional road transport environments. Since 
the beach itself provides the road surface, there are no formal road markings, the path to take shifts throughout the 
day, and the surface is uneven, variable, and is often impinged upon by water, debris and other natural materials. 
Supporting infrastructure is minimal, with very little regulatory signage, beyond occasional speed limits as drivers 
near one of the islands three beachside communities.There are no formal roundabouts, intersections or road lanes.
The driving environment is also impacted by the actor decision-making undertaken for the location of the 
designated camping sites along the eastern beach. Drivers may have to cover significant distances to find sufficient 
space for their camp, or indeed a site that they feel is most ‘away from it all’. This driving occurs against a backdrop 
of time limitations as the best time for beach travel is two hours either side of the low tides. As such it is during 
these hours that there is peak movement of vehicles along the beach adding additional constraints to the safety of the 
beach driving system. 
Distraction of the driver is also a significant risk for beach driving – there is much to look at, yet there is also the 
uncertainty that comes with limited signage or indeed landmarks to measure your journey. The driving environment 
is without many distinguishing features, simply the ocean or the brush covered dunes. Further the lack of posted 
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speed limits allows for creep and uncertainty on what should be considered a safe speed. Distances and itineraries all 
become uncertain when the road is simply a beach which is managed and maintained by natural processes alone.
A final important feature at this level is the presence of other vehicles that influence driving behaviours. The 
presence of aeroplanes has been discussed but other unique forms of vehicles include 4WD tour buses; trucks for 
waste management and even ship wrecks on the beach (e.g. the SS Maheno 1905 - 1935).
5. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to examine the stakeholders residing within the beach driving system on K’gari, a sand 
island off the South Coast of Queensland, Australia. The intention was, first, to identify those who share the 
responsibility for beach driving crashes, and second, to identify differences between the K’gari beach driving system 
and conventional Australian road systems. These lines of inquiry are important as they determine what interventions 
should be introduced and who could develop and introduce them.
The first important conclusion from the ActorMap presented is that, like all complex sociotechnical systems, the 
beach driving system on K’gari is a complex one that comprises many different actors and organisations across 
many different levels, including the higher government level. The ActorMap shows a diverse range of actors and 
organisations, covering international, national, state and local stakeholders. According to Rasmussen’s risk 
management framework, the decisions and actions of all of the stakeholders identified interact to play a role in beach 
driving crashes. 
A second, and inescapable conclusion is that despite being classified as a gazetted road, the K’gari beach driving 
systems represents a unique driving system and one that is entirely different to conventional Australian road 
transport systems. Although actors and organizations span both, the nature of the K’gari beach driving system is 
vastly different, particularly at the lower levels. The ActorMap depicts a driving system in which recreational beach 
goers can freely interact with cars travelling at 80km/h, in which vehicles can operate on either side of the road, and 
in which planes can take off and land using the same ‘road’ surface. In addition, there is an absence of formal road 
infrastructures and the road itself shifts and changes dynamically. An important implication of this finding is that a 
conventional road safety approach to crash prevention is likely to be inappropriate. In short, a beach driving specific 
response is required. What this response should entail forms a critical research agenda that involves understanding 
beach driving crashes and the beach driving environment and developing appropriate interventions.
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